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 THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF
 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS*
 PATRICIA DANZON
 Hoover Institution
 I. INTRODUCTION
 THE early seventies witnessed a rapid increase in the frequency and
 severity of medical malpractice claims.' In California, for example, both
 frequency and severity increased at an average rate of almost 20 percent
 per annum, cumulating to yield an increase in total claim costs per physi-
 cian of roughly 40 percent per annum.2 As striking as the growth over time
 is the variation among states. For example, in 1976 there was an 18-fold
 range in malpractice claim frequency, per capita or per physician, and a
 30-fold range in severity.
 At the time of the 1975 medical malpractice "crisis," the explosion of
 claims was attributed to many factors, including growth in the number
 and complexity of medical treatments; pro-plaintiff trends in common law
 in general, and in particular the demise of traditional malpractice defenses
 such as charitable immunity and the locality rule; an increase in the num-
 ber of lawyers and passage of no-fault automobile legislation in some
 states; and such intangible factors as the erosion of physician-patient
 relationships.
 In response to the crisis, tort "reforms" were enacted in most states
 during 1975 and 1976. These measures vary in detail from state to state,
 but their common purpose is to control claim costs by limiting the size of
 * This research was funded by contract between the Health Care Financing Administration
 and the Rand Corporation, by the Institute for Civil Justice and by the Hoover Institution.
 Views expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the research
 sponsors. I would like to thank Robert Bell and William Butz for helpful comments, Chris-
 tine Peterson for able programming assistance, and Jane Adler for compiling the survey of
 legislation in Appendix A.
 "Severity" is average dollar indemnity, per paid claim, including court awards and
 payments in out-of-court settlement.
 2 Patricia Munch, Causes of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Risks and Regula-
 tion, in The Economics of Medical Malpractice 125 (Simon Rottenberg ed. 1978).
 [Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXVII (April 1984)]
 ? 1984 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/84/2701-0005$01.50
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 awards and the scope of liability of medical providers. After 1976, average
 claim frequency countrywide actually fell, but severity continued to out-
 pace the rate of inflation. To what extent the downturn in frequency was
 the result of tort reforms remains an open question. However, other
 branches of tort law-notably product liability-have experienced trends
 in litigation similar to, if less extreme than, those in medical malpractice.
 This suggests that the determinants of malpractice litigation may lie be-
 yond factors specific to medical care and malpractice law.
 The purpose of this paper is to provide some empirical evidence on the
 contribution of these various factors to the diversity across states and
 changes over time in the frequency and severity of malpractice claims.
 Specifically, I attempt to measure the effect of medical and demographic
 characteristics, trends in litigation in other lines, and changes in common
 and statutory law, using data on claims closed in 1970 and 1975-78. To the
 extent variation in claims is due to variation in the frequency and type of
 medical treatments, tort reforms may be inappropriate and ineffective. On
 the other hand, if variation in claims is due primarily to variation in
 incentives created by the legal system, then tort reforms which reduce
 these incentives will reduce claim costs. The optimal design of such tort
 reforms in the context of the overall role of the liability system is a crucial
 issue beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief positive analysis of
 the determinants of the post-1975 tort reforms is presented.
 The remainder of this introductory section compares countrywide
 trends in medical malpractice and other lines and presents some summary
 statistics on differences among states and trends over time in malpractice
 claims. Section II presents a simple model of the determinants of fre-
 quency and severity of claims. Section III describes the data and methods
 of estimation. Section IV reports the empirical analysis of frequency of
 claims per capita, severity per claim, and claim cost per capita. Section V
 analyzes the determinants of the post-1975 tort reforms. Section VI sum-
 marizes the findings.
 Countrywide Comparison across Lines
 Figures 1 and 2 plot indices of claim frequency and severity in several
 liability lines, based on data reported by the Insurance Services Office
 (ISO). These data on claims incurred, by policy year, reflect ISO's esti-
 mate of the ultimate cost of claims against policies written in a 12-month
 period, based on claims reported to date and projections derived from
 past experience.3 Estimates are therefore less reliable for lines, such as
 3 As the main rating bureau for property-casualty insurance, ISO collects data from
 member companies, adjusted for trends, and publishes advisory premium rates. The number
 of companies reporting their loss experience to ISO varies by line and by state. Although
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 18:43:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 117
 180
 Product Bodily Injury (Manual rated) (a)
 170 - Physicians and Surgeons, as of 3/80. (b)
 Physicians and Surgeons, as of 4/75. (C)
 Hospitals (d)
 - - - Automobile Bodily Injury (e) I0 160 Owners, Landlords and Tenants Bodily Injury (f)
 Manufacturers and Contractors Bodily Injury (g)
 150
 140
 130
 90 /
 80 (b)
 70
 (c)
 60
 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
 YEAR
 FIGURE 1.-Frequency of claims 1977 = 100
 medical malpractice and product liability, with relatively long lags in filing
 and disposition of claims; in more immature (recent) policy years; for
 severity than for frequency, because of the lag in disposition; and in times
 of rapid change, because projections are based on past experience.
 Frequency of claims against physicians and hospitals shows a sharp
 peak in the mid-seventies, which is mirrored to some extent by other
 lines, notably product liability and owners', landlords', and tenants' lia-
 bility. The discrepancy between the two series for physicians-the first
 these data are neither random nor comprehensive, they are probably reasonably representa-
 tive of trends. Claims incurred, by policy year, include claims closed, claims reported but
 still open and an estimate of claims not yet filed ("incurred but not reported"), against all
 policies starting in a particular calendar year. Compared to claims closed, by calendar year,
 which are used in the subsequent analysis in this paper, incurred claims should reflect
 changes in filings more rapidly.
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 FIGURE 2.-Claim severity (total limits) 1977 = 100
 reflecting information available as of April 1975, the second as of March
 1980-reflects the unanticipated decrease in the latter half of the decade.
 For all lines, severity has outpaced the general rate of inflation. Be-
 tween 1971-78, the severity trend of 12.4 percent per annum for physi-
 cians and 18.9 percent for hospitals is comparable to the 19.4 percent and
 12.1 percent for product liability bodily injury and physical damage, re-
 spectively, and 14.1 percent and 15.6 percent for automobile bodily injury
 and physical damage.4
 4 The increase in average severity tends to overstate the increase in severity for a given
 injury, if the decline in frequency reflects an elimination of minor claims. The average lag
 from filing to disposition increased from eighteen months for malpractice claims closed in
 1975 to twenty-five months for claims closed in 1978. This may reflect a reduction in the
 filing of minor claims, which close relatively quickly, and/or longer lags in disposition,
 possibly due to the uncertainty created by the changes in law.
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 Medical Malpractice: Comparison across States
 Table 1 reports summary statistics on trends in the frequency and se-
 verity of malpractice claims closed by calendar year.5 The unit of obser-
 vation is the mean for each state.
 Between 1970 and 1975 the median rate of growth of claims closed per
 100,000 population was 29 percent per annum.6 Between 1975 and 1977
 frequency fell and then leveled off in 1978. Year-to-year changes were
 highly erratic across states, but in general states starting at a relatively
 low level grew more rapidly, such that the range between the most and
 least litigious states narrowed, from 3.3 to 44.4 claims per 100,000 in 1975,
 to 1.4 to 17.4 in 1978.7
 Between 1975 and 1978, the median rate of increase of severity is 30
 percent, while the mean exceeds 60 percent, reflecting the impact of a few
 states with dramatic changes. This mean of the state means grew more
 rapidly than the countrywide mean, because the majority of small states
 grew more rapidly than the few states which account for most of the
 claims. Year-to-year changes are even more volatile for severity than for
 frequency, ranging from -90 percent to + 1,000 percent, reflecting the
 small number of claims in some states and the huge potential range of
 awards." As in the case of frequency, severity grew most rapidly in states
 where the initial level was low.
 In general, the spread between the minimum and the twenty-fifth per-
 centile is much smaller than the spread between the seventy-fifth percen-
 tile and the maximum, indicating highly skewed distributions, with a few
 states having much more adverse experience than the majority.
 II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY
 The relationships of major economic and policy interest-the deterrent
 effect of tort sanctions on quality of care and the determinants of incen-
 tives to file a claim-cannot be estimated directly because there are no
 ' Claims closed in a given calendar year include claims filed in several prior calendar
 years.
 6 The data underlying these estimates are described below. The growth rate between 1970
 and 1975 reported in Table I is probably upward biased because the 1970 sample is incom-
 plete, by as much as 30 percent. For 1975-78 claim counts in some years for some states
 may be incomplete. Since data were only collected for July-December 1975, the estimate
 used here for 1975 frequency is twice this six-month count.
 7 Washington, D.C., is an extreme outlier in 1975, with claim frequency twice that of the
 second ranked state, California. Correlation coefficients between year-to-year growth rates
 and level in the initial year range from -.2 to -.4 for frequency, and -.3 to -.5 for
 severity.
 8 In 1976, thirty-five states had fewer than 100 paid claims.
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 TABLE 1
 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY: STATE MEANS, LEVELS, AND GROWTH RATES
 25th Per- 75th Per-
 Mean Median centile centile Minimum Maximum
 Claims per 100,000 population
 1970* 2.76 2.56 1.99 3.27 .35 8.86
 1975 10.04 8.98 6.42 12.14 3.34 44.38
 1976 7.17 6.47 4.78 8.39 1.24 21.99
 1977 6.09 5.81 3.92 7.52 1.72 13.76
 1978 6.23 5.81 3.96 7.89 1.40 17.44
 Growth rate:t
 75 + 705 33.2 28.7 20.8 38.4 8.1 79.7
 76 + 75 -26.3 -27.4 -42.6 -8.7 -70.8 31.1
 77 + 76 -8.9 - 9.3 -21.3 3.3 - 57.6 121.0
 78 + 77 7.8 2.0 - 15.0 26.2 -59.5 124.4
 Paid claims per 100,000:
 1975 3.64 3.10 2.12 4.58 .96 18.59
 1976 2.81 2.67 1.73 3.62 .37 8.16
 1977 2.51 2.37 1.47 3.26 .43 6.18
 1978 2.68 2.37 1.51 3.44 .52 6.57
 Severity ($)
 1975 19,793 16,719 11,186 25,429 2,789 62,120
 1976 24,505 21,612 14,640 29,643 3,427 89,147
 1977 29,945 25,335 19,525 39,101 3,816 102,317
 1978 36,766 32,550 16,961 49,096 5,267 160,161
 Growth rate
 76 + 75 67.4 33.8 - 12.2 83.3 -92.6 575.0
 77 + 76 60.8 33.6 -23.5 78.0 -75.0 1,053.0
 78 + 77 67.9 25.0 - 30.6 76.5 - 80.0 1,534.0
 * 1970 sample incomplete.
 t Growth rate = [(claims,/claim,_ 1) - I] x 100.
 t [(claims75/claims70)'5 - 1] x 100.
 o
 o
 tT
 0
 z
 tTI
 0
 zj
 0
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 data on injuries and claims filed. The only data are claims closed, which
 reflect injuries indirectly and claims filed with a lag. This section outlines
 the structural model underlying the reduced-form equations which are
 estimated from these closed claim data. The frequency of claims closed
 per capita, the severity per paid claim and changes in statutory law are
 viewed as a simultaneously determined system of equations.
 Overview of the Model
 Frequency of Claims. In order to establish a claim for medical
 malpractice, a plaintiff must show that he sustained damages during the
 course of medical treatment; that the treatment violated the standard of
 due care; and that the injury was causally related to the negligent treat-
 ment. The frequency of claims filed therefore depends on the frequency of
 injury, the standard of care, and the incentives to file.
 Exposure to iatrogenic injury (adverse outcomes related to medical
 care) in any period depends on the frequency of medical treatments,
 although a strictly proportional relationship is not expected, since the mix
 of treatments changes with the quantity. The actual frequency of injuries
 depends on the normal risk of the procedures performed and on the incen-
 tives of medical providers to practice with care, which incentives in turn
 depend on expected sanctions through the tort system, if negligent.9
 Given the flow of injuries, the stock of potential claims at any point
 depends on the standard of care being applied by the courts and the
 statute of limitations. Although in general the standard of due care is
 defined by the customary practice of the profession, the courts have
 expanded the scope of liability of medical providers in recent years by
 rejecting traditional defenses and recognizing new grounds for action. For
 example, abolition of the locality rule substitutes a statewide or national
 standard for a local standard of acceptable practice; the abolition of chari-
 table and government immunity has exposed voluntary and government
 hospitals to suit; the doctrine of respondeat superior extends the liability
 of hospitals for the actions of their employees; the doctrine of informed
 consent set new standards for disclosure of risk. Courts have also occa-
 sionally asserted the right to override medical custom and apply a cost-
 benefit calculus to individual cases.10
 9 The word "injuries" denotes all adverse medical outcomes, including those attributable
 to negligent care and those within the normal risk of acceptable care. A study of iatrogenic
 injuries in twenty-three California hospitals estimated that 17 percent were potentially ac-
 tionable under the negligence system. California Medical Association and California Hos-
 pital Association, Report on the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (1977).
 0o Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d. 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
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 Changes in legal rules that reduce costs or increase the payoff to suit
 tend to increase the stock of potential claims. Changes which expand the
 scope of liability have a similar effect, to the extent the changes are
 applied retroactively. Incidents previously considered not worth filing or
 within normal risk become potentially actionable under the new stan-
 dards. The increment to the stock of potential claims depends on the
 statute of limitations, which determines how many years of prior practice
 may be affected by current changes."
 Incentives to file from the stock of potential claims depend on the ex-
 pected payoff to filing, net of costs. The expected payoff is the product of
 the probability of winning, which depends on the standard of care ap-
 plied by the courts, and the expected award, which depends on the dam-
 ages incurred and the law defining compensation (see below). The costs
 of filing a claim are determined by the wage rate of attorneys, the oppor-
 tunity cost of the plaintiffs time, and the expected (optimized) input of
 effort, which depends on the rules of procedure and evidence. Recent rule
 changes which have effectively reduced plaintiffs' litigation costs include
 abolition or modification of the locality rule;12 allowing medical texts as
 evidence of customary practice, and expansion of the doctrine of res ipsa
 loquitur, which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. In an attempt
 to contain this trend, since 1975 many states have reinstated some form of
 locality rule and limited the application of res ipsa. Other states have
 introduced arbitration or pretrial screening panels, which may lower costs
 and hence raise the net payoff to filing.13
 The frequency of claims closed in any year reflects the rate of filings in
 several prior years and the lag in disposition, which may exceed ten years
 but averages around two years.
 Average Severity. The potential award per paid claim (potential se-
 " Even with static standards, the long-run equilibrium frequency of actionable injuries
 could be nonzero for several reasons. First, if physicians pay less than the full cost of
 negligent injuries, because some injured patients do not sue or because liability insurance
 premiums are not experience rated, then incentives are insufficient to eliminate all negli-
 gence. Very crude estimates suggest that at most one in ten potentially actionable injuries
 give rise to a claim. Second, if the courts set standards above the efficient level, it is cheaper
 for a physician to pay damages than to comply. Third, if standards are set at the efficient
 level for the average physician, it may be cheaper for the below average physician to pay
 damages than comply. The contribution of these factors to claim frequency cannot be tested
 with the data available.
 12 If local physicians are unwilling to testify against each other-the alleged "conspiracy
 of silence"'-abolition of the locality rule reduces the cost to the plaintiff of obtaining expert
 testimony.
 13 The net effect of these alternative forums is highly uncertain a priori, since they may
 change expected recoveries as well as costs. See Patricia A. Ebener, with the assistance of
 Jane Wilson-Adler, Molly Selvin, & Michael S. Yesley, Court Efforts to Reduce Pretrial
 Delay, Institute for Civil Justice, R-2732-1CJ, Rand Corporation (1981).
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 verity) depends on the "true" damages incurred on claims closed with
 payment and the valuation of these damages by the courts. For nonfatal
 claims, "true" damages depend on the severity of the injury, the plain-
 tiff's actual or potential wage level, and his life expectancy. Rules of
 compensable damages determine the valuation of these damages by the
 courts. The trend over time at common law has been to extend the catego-
 ries of compensable damages from tangible "economic loss" (forgone
 wages and medical expense) to less tangible items, such as loss of consor-
 tium and pain and suffering. Since 1975, many states have modified basic
 tort damage rules for cases of medical malpractice by such measures as:
 dollar ceilings, either on the total award or on some component; modifica-
 tion of the collateral source rule, to admit evidence and, in some states,
 mandate offset of compensation from other sources against the tort recov-
 ery; elimination of the plaintiff's ad damnum (the dollar amount claimed
 as damages); and periodic payment of future damages.
 The predicted effects of explanatory variables on potential awards do
 not carry over immediately to observed severity per paid claim. For ex-
 ample, let r denote the implicit value per unit of true damages defined by
 the legal rules governing compensation. Observed average severity per
 paid claim could rise or fall in response to an increase in r. This is because
 an increase in r not only raises actual awards on inframarginal claims but
 also raises the expected net payoff on all potential claims and therefore
 induces filing of claims with true damages or probability of winning too
 low to have been worth filing prior to the increase in r. Differences in
 average severity across states or changes over time understate differences
 in r to the extent the composition of the claim universe changes in re-
 sponse to a change in r. Observed severity therefore depends on the
 fraction of claims filed from the potential stock.
 Changes in Law. In principle, both common and statutory law are
 endogenous. They are influenced by some of the same demographic char-
 acteristics that affect the frequency and severity of claims, and by the
 frequency and severity of claims themselves. Only the post-1975 tort
 reforms are explicitly modeled here. Standard public choice theory pre-
 dicts that tort reforms would be more comprehensive and/or passed ear-
 lier in states which experienced a high level or rate of increase of insur-
 ance premiums, in which the medical profession and insurance industry
 were relatively powerful and the legal profession relatively weak. This is
 discussed in more detail below.
 Structural Model
 The analysis of the previous section may be described formally by a
 system of equations in which the frequency of claims per capita, the
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 18:43:06 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 124 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
 severity per paid claim, and the post-1975 statutory changes in law are
 simultaneously determined. The following notation is used: K* = stock of
 potential claims; K = claims filed per capita; A = average severity per
 paid claim; F = claims closed per capita; T = total claim cost per capita;
 L = common-law and statutory rules of liability, evidence, and compen-
 sable damages; Y = characteristics of medical providers; Z = character-
 istics of patient population; X = characteristics of lawyer population; S
 = term of statute of limitations; Q = quality of medical care; r = com-
 pensation per unit of damages; C = litigation costs; D = cost of negli-
 gence borne by physicians (deterrent effect); I = flow of iatrogenic in-
 juries; P = malpractice insurance premiums; bi = fraction of claims
 closed in ith year after filing; r = maximum lag in disposition.
 The rate of iatrogenic injury in year t depends on characteristics of the
 medical provider (Y) and patient (Z) populations, and on the quality of
 care (Q) which in turn is influenced by the perceived cost of negligence
 (D) to medical providers:
 I, = I[ Y,, Zt, Qt(D)]. (1)
 The stock of potential claims in year t is a function of the injury rate in
 prior years for which the statute of limitations (S) has not yet run, and the
 standards applied by the courts (Lt):
 t-S
 K* = K* [I, L,]. (2)
 i=t
 The frequency of claims filed from the stock of potential claims depends
 on the expected net payoff, which is determined by legal rules (which
 affect the probability and cost of proving negligence and define compen-
 sable damages), the cost of legal services, and demographic factors which
 affect true damages and plaintiff time costs:
 K, = K[K*, r(Lt), C(Lt), Xt, Zt]. (3)
 Frequency of claims closed in year t, F,, is some fraction, 8, of claims filed
 in several prior years, depending on delays in disposition:
 Ft= > iKi (4)
 i=t
 or, in reduced form,
 F, = F[ Y, Z, D, L, X], (4')
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 where 7, the maximum lag in disposition, may exceed ten years.14 Thus
 coefficients of demographic characteristics in the reduced form claim fre-
 quency equation compound effects from the structural equations for in-
 juries and incentives to file. In particular, old people have higher exposure
 to medical treatment and higher risk of injury but lower time costs and
 lower expected payoff to filing. Income is positively related to the fre-
 quency and complexity of medical treatments, compensable damages,
 and the time costs of filing. Thus the net effects of age and income on
 claim frequency are ambiguous a priori.
 Potential severity depends on the types of injuries and hence, indi-
 rectly, on medical characteristics. Potential severity is positively related
 to number of medical treatments per capita if marginal visits are for more
 minor ailments, and positively related to surgery rates if surgical proce-
 dures typically involve more severe injuries. Potential severity is nega-
 tively related to the proportion of elderly people and positively related to
 per capita income; negatively related to tort reforms which reduce com-
 pensation per unit damages, r(L); and positively (negatively) related to the
 cost and hence the input of legal services, if the marginal return to addi-
 tional legal effort falls less (more) for the plaintiff than the defense. These
 implications for potential severity should apply to observed severity con-
 trolling for the fraction of claims filed from the potential stock, which may
 be approximated by claim frequency:
 A, = A[I, Z, r(L), F] (5)
 or, in reduced form,
 At = A[ Y, D, Z, X, L]. (5')
 Total claim cost per capita is simply the product of frequency and
 severity and therefore depends on the same variables:
 T, = T[ Y, D, Z, X, L]. (6)
 The propensity to enact tort reforms early and/or be more restrictive of
 plaintiff interests depends on frequency and severity of claims in 1975, the
 level of malpractice insurance premiums, and on medical, legal, and de-
 mographic characteristics:15
 L75 = L(F75, A75, P75, Y75, Z75, X75). (7)
 '4 Strictly, the 8, should be treated as endogenous, but the data available do not permit
 identification. Year subscripts are dropped where the value of a variable over several years
 is relevant.
 15 The 1974 values of explanatory variables would be more appropriate but 1975 is the
 earliest year for which claim and premium data are available.
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 The equations to be estimated are the reduced-form equations for fre-
 quency of claims closed (4'), average severity per paid claim (5'), total
 claim cost (6), and 1975 tort reform (7).
 III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
 Data
 The data on claims were drawn from two surveys of claims closed by
 insurance companies in 1970 and 1975-78. The 1970 survey is a weighted
 random sample of claims closed by 26 insurers that accounted for 90
 percent of the market. Because the number of paid claims is very small in
 some states, severity is not calculated for 1970. The 1975-78 survey cov-
 ered all insurers writing malpractice premiums of $1 million or more in
 any year since 1970.16 Claims against multiple defendants arising from the
 same incident have been consolidated. These data on claims closed reflect
 claims filed on average two years earlier.
 Data on common law doctrines adopted prior to 1970 are from a survey
 reported in Dietz, Baird, and Berul.'7 A dummy variable (1970 LAWS)
 which takes values 0-4 measures the number of the following doctrines
 recognized: abolition of the locality rule, informed consent, abolition of
 charitable immunity, and respondeat superior. Data on the statute of
 limitations, before and after any changes, and on other post-1975 tort
 reforms, were compiled by a survey of the relevant statutes. Each law is
 measured as the number of months prior to December 1978 during which
 the law was in effect. Thus these values range from zero, if a law was
 never passed, to 48 if a law was passed in January 1975. The pre- and
 post-1975 statutes of limitations are measured in years for filing for adults.
 If there is a discovery rule with no outer limit, the statute of limitations is
 arbitrarily assigned a value of 10.18 Appendix A lists the statutes and
 common-law doctrines used in this analysis.
 Malpractice insurance costs are measured by two variables: the rate
 16 The 1970 survey is described in Westat, Inc., Study of Medical Malpractice Claims
 Closed in 1970 (1973). The 1975-78 survey is described in National Association of Insurance
 Commissioners (NAIC), 2 Malpractice Claims (September 1980). A dummy variable iden-
 tifying states with known underreporting was not significant in the regressions. In both
 surveys, claims against physicians are probably more fully represented than claims against
 hospitals because of hospital self-insurance.
 '7 Stephen Dietz, C. Bruce Baird, & Lawrence Berul, "The Medical Malpractice Legal
 System," in Appendix to the Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice
 73-89, DHEW No. (OS) (1973).
 18 Many states have exceptions to the basic statute for cases involving minors or fraud
 and concealment by the physician. A discovery rule tolls the running of the statute until the
 injury is, or "with reasonable diligence" should have been, discovered. A dummy variable
 for states with a discovery rule was not significant.
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 filed by ISO for general practitioners, for basic limits of coverage, effec-
 tive March 1975; and the percentage increase recommended by ISO in
 April 1975.19
 Data on demographic and medical characteristics were obtained from
 several sources. Where possible, values as of two years prior to the year
 of the dependent variable are used, corresponding to the average lag in
 disposition of claims. All variables are listed in Table 2, together with
 means, standard deviations, and sources.
 Methodology
 System Issues. The data consist of four annual cross-sections (five for
 claim frequency). Serial correlation of residuals is expected, especially
 for claim frequency where the lag in closing claims induces strong correla-
 tion across years. In addition to within-state serial correlation, contem-
 poraneous correlation across states in each year is likely. To allow for an
 unconstrained autoregressive process with endogenous explanatory vari-
 ables, I use generalized least squares (GLS) or three stage least squares
 (3SLS) applied to the pooled cross-sections.20 The estimated covariances
 across years are large for adjacent years but decline over time.21 To allow
 for contemporaneous correlation, the intercept for each year is free to
 vary.
 In principle, a predicted value of frequency should be included in the
 severity equation and a lagged predicted value of severity might be in-
 cluded in the frequency equation, as an indicator of r. In practice, when
 these predicted values were included, all coefficients became insignifi-
 cant. The equations were therefore estimated in reduced form, omitting
 predicted values but including explanatory variables from the other equa-
 "9 Since ISO specialty and excess limits differentials are uniform across states, the ISO
 basic rate is a pure index of ISO state differentials. However, since ISO rates are used only
 for a small fraction of the market, they are an imperfect index of premiums actually paid.
 Buddy Steves & Archer McWhorter, Jr., Notes on the Malpractice Insurance Market, 28
 Chartered Property & Casualty Underwriters (CPCU) Annals (1975). As a more accurate
 measure of premiums actually paid, I constructed a measure of state relativities based on a
 survey of premiums paid by a nationwide sample of physicians in 1975. The survey and data
 are described in Nancy T. Greenspan, A Descriptive Analysis of Medical Malpractice Insur-
 ance Premiums, 1974-77, 1, no. 2 Health Care Financing Rev. 69 (1979). The determinants
 of premium levels are analyzed in Patricia Munch Danzon, Why Are Malpractice Premiums
 So High-or So Low? (R-2623-HCFA, Rand Corporation 1980). This premium measure had
 lower explanatory power than the ISO variables.
 20 Estimation from first differences was unsuccessful, possibly because there is little
 variation in some of the independent variables over the short span of years in the sample,
 and because the autoregressive process is complex.
 21 The pattern is not sufficiently stable to justify imposing a structure on the covariance
 matrix.
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 TABLE 2
 MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, DEFINITION, AND SOURCE OF ALL VARIABLES
 Standard
 Variable Mean Deviation Definition Source
 % urban 66.8 15.1 % population in places - 25,000 population in 1970 Statistical Abstracts
 % old .102 .018 % population over 65 Statistical Abstracts
 MDs per capita 1.21 .412 Total nonfederal physicians in patient care, per 100,000 AMA, Physician Distribu-
 population tion and Medical Licen-
 sure in the U.S.
 1970 LAWS 2.48 .789 No. of doctrines applied by 1970: locality rule expanded or Dietz, Baird & Berul, su-
 rejected; charitable immunity rejected; respondeat ap- pra note 17
 plied; informed consent applied
 1970 stat lim 7.76 3.55 Statute of limitations for adults, pre 1975; = 10 if unre- David W. Louisell &
 stricted discovery period Harold Williams, Med-
 ical Malpractice (1973 &
 supps.)'.
 OLT severity 7.80 .284 Severity per paid claim, owners, landlords and tenants, Insurance Services Office
 bodily injury liability - log
 No fault .32 .47 = 1 if state adopted no fault automobile; = 0 otherwise
 1975 stat lim 3.52 3.54 Statute of limitations for adults, after post-1975 changes, if Louisell & Williams
 any; = 10 if unlimited discovery
 Ad damnum 18.14 17.22 Ad damnum eliminated; months pre Dec. 1978 Statutes
 CAP 10.22 16.00 Cap on awards; months pre Dec. 1978 Statutes
 Collateral source 5.36 13.52 Mandatory offset of collateral compensation; months pre Statutes
 Dec. 1978
 Fee limit 12.22 17.11 Limit on contingent fees; months pre Dec. 1978 Statutes
 Share 64.60 13.21 Market share of leading insurer, 1974 Steves & McWhorter, su-
 pra note 19
 % medical society .601 .128 % physicians belonging to state or local medical society, AMA
 1975
 1975 ISO rate 5.73 1.79 ISO rate for class I physicians, as of March 1975. Log. ISO
 ISO increase 1.45 1.15 % rate of increase recommended by ISO, April 1975 ISO
 1970 consent .48 .50 = 1 if informed consent applied by 1970 Dietz, Baird & Berul
 = 0 otherwise
 1970 respondeat .66 .49 = 1 if respondeat superior applied by 1970 Dietz, Baird & Berul
 = 0 otherwise
 Lawyers per capita 1.83 1.62 Lawyers per 100,000 population ABA membership report
 %ABA 58.67 10.36 % of lawyers belonging to American Bar Association ABA membership report
 o
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 tion. To show net effects of explanatory variables, equations for total
 claim cost per capita are also reported.22
 Functional Form. Logarithmic transformations of the two dollar-
 dependent variables, severity per claim, and claim cost per capita are
 used for theoretical and empirical reasons. If the effects of random shocks
 and changes in law are multiplicative rather than additive, then the log
 transformation is appropriate. Empirically, severity per claim and claim
 cost per capita are approximately log normally distributed.23 For the fre-
 quency of claims per capita, a logistic transformation is used. This yields
 a closer approximation to a normal distribution than either claims per
 capita or the log of claims per capita.24
 Weighting. Because each observation represents grouped data,
 weighting to account for heteroscedasticity seems appropriate, but with-
 out prior knowledge of the error structure, the choice of weighting system
 entails judgment. For severity per claim and claim cost per capita, each
 observation is weighted by the number of observations in the underlying
 sample: number of paid claims and population in the state, respectively.25
 For the frequency of claims per capita, the weights are related to but not
 strictly proportional to the state population, following a formula proposed
 by Amemiya and Nold.26 The influence of weighting on estimates for
 frequency are discussed below and in Appendix B.
 22 Coefficients in the (log) total claim cost equation are not expected to be precisely the
 sum of coefficients in the frequency and severity equations because the logit rather than
 the log transformation of frequency is used and because different weights were used for the
 frequency and severity equations.
 23 The estimation techniques presuppose that the residuals are normally distributed. Nor-
 mality of the dependent variable is a rough guide to the normality of the residuals.
 24 Because claims are measured per 100,000 population, the logit formulation is only
 approximately correct. Since claims per 100,000 is near zero, the error is very small.
 25 Since four years of data are pooled but sample size is relatively constant across years
 for each state, the weight used is the average of the four individual year weights.
 26 Let nit be the population of state i in year t, and for k = 1, ..., nit, let Y,, be a binary
 random variable representing the closing of a claim by the kth person, which takes the value
 of one with probability,
 Pit
 1 + e - (PXit + vit)
 where vit (0, a2). Then the logit of claim frequency is
 ft = log 1 - Fit = Xit + Vit + uit- PXit + Eit
 where
 F,, = Yit Y k=1
 The variance of Eit, rit, is approximately 2 + [nitFit(1 - Fit)] - An estimate of uri, the
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 IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
 Table 3 reports coefficient estimates from pooled, cross-section equa-
 tions, including medical, demographic, and legal characteristics existing
 prior to 1975, with all coefficients constrained to be equal in all years. In
 order to identify the net effects of laws, which are of primary interest but
 are highly correlated with and may merely reflect demographic variables,
 the estimates were performed in a stepwise fashion. For each dependent
 variable (frequency, severity, and total claim cost) three specifications are
 reported. The first includes only medical and demographic factors (physi-
 cians per capita, population over sixty-five, and degree of urbanization).
 The second equation adds characteristics of the legal profession intended
 to measure the supply price of legal services (lawyers per capita and
 membership in the American Bar Association). The third adds specific
 laws. Table 4 reports implied elasticities from the third equation. The
 post-1975 tort reforms were then added. Table 5 reports constrained and
 unconstrained year-specific coefficients for all law variables.27
 Medical and Demographic Factors
 Medical exposure, as measured by number of physicians per capita, is a
 significant determinant of claim frequency but not severity. The estimates
 imply that, at variable means, an increase of 100 physicians per capita
 adds an additional 3.6 claims per capita, with an elasticity of 0.6. Thus the
 40 percent increase in physicians per capita between 1960 and 1978 could
 account for a 24 percent increase in claims over this period, a small
 fraction of the total increase. The elasticity less than unity suggests that
 marginal medical treatments involve less risky procedures.
 average state-specific variance over the period 1975-78, is obtained as follows: Calculate
 4 505050
 s2(f'4't - 3Xi,)2( - Fi)
 4 50t=1 i=O 1 i=
 where p is estimated from the unweighted system of four equations, and F, = a -4= 1 Fi,.
 Then -2 = s2 [niFi(1 Fi)] 1 and wi 2, Then , = s2 + [nF( - i)-1 and w = 6- 2 is the weight applied to the ith state. This yields weights ranging from 2.48 to 2.99, whereas weights for claim ccst per capita (popula-
 tion) range from 20 to 147 and for severity (number of paid claims) range from 2.5 to 34.4.
 Weights which assign most weight to the few most populous states, tend to yield higher t-
 statistics, but the main conclusions are not affected by the weighting system used. Takeshi
 Amemiya & Frederick Nold, A Modified Logit Model, 57 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 255 (1975).
 27 Constraining coefficients to be equal across years effectively quadruples sample size so
 increases estimation efficiency if the coefficients are equal in all years. In the reduced-form
 equations of Table 3, coefficients are theoretically not equal for variables which affect claims
 both directly and indirectly through their effect on tort reforms. However, using an F-test,
 the hypothesis of equal coefficients could not be rejected.
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 TABLE 3
 MALPRACTICE CLAIM FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY: MEDICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND PRE-1975 LEGAL VARIABLES
 Claim Frequency per Severity per Claim Total Claim Cost
 100,000 Pop. Logl - F) (Log) per 100,000 (Log) 100,000\ -o. o IF /
 % urban .012 .012 .014 .015 .013 .012 .034 .030 .032
 (3.31) (3.18) (3.85) (3.94) (3.41) (3.11) (5.66) (5.02) (5.50)
 M.D.'s per capita .516 .610 .543 .356 .170 .026 .327 .156 .087
 (4.23) (3.66) (3.33) (3.15) (1.03) (.16) (1.45) (.51) (.29)
 % old 2.99 3.32 .774 1.81 1.25 .391 6.62 5.65 2.59
 (1.32) (1.42) (.34) (.99) (.70) (.21) (1.98) (1.65) (.75)
 1970 laws ... ... .143 . . . ... .069 . . . . . . .215
 (2.81) (1.38) (2.80)
 1970 statute of ... ... .011 . . . . . .016 . . . ... .025
 limitations (.98) (1.59) (1.44)
 OLT severity ... ... - .089 . . . . . . .163 . . . . . .072
 (1.31) (1.35) (.58)
 No fault ... ... -.143 . . . .. .102 . . . ... .104
 (1.56) (1.57) (.85)
 Lawyers per capita -.030 -.024 . . . .051 .065 . . . .043 .048
 (.80) (.62) (1.20) (1.59) (.42) (.50)
 % ABA member .003 .005 . . . -.008 -.005 . . . -.008 -.003
 (.84) (1.25) (2.53) (1.85) (1.47) (.65)
 R2 .239 .246 .333 .314 .347 .410 .308 .292 .371
 NOTE.--It in parentheses. Weighted GLS estimates of equations (4'), (5'), and (6). Coefficients constrained across years 1970, 1975-78 for frequency, 1975-78
 otherwise.
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 TABLE 4
 PARTIAL DERIVATIVES AND ELASTICITIES DERIVED FROM TABLES 3 AND 5
 CLAIM FREQUENCY TOTAL CLAIM COST
 PER 100,000 POPULATION SEVERITY PER CLAIM PER 100,000 POPULATION
 Partial Elasticity Partial Elasticity Partial Elasticity
 (WP)N(TaFX)RYaLnA (aAXaLn T ( aT XT EXPLANATORY VARIABLE axa Fax /TAax \XT
 % urban .0009** .86** .012** .80** .032** 2.16**
 M.D.'s per capita .036** .61**. ..
 1970 laws .330** .33** .069 .17 .215** .53**
 1970 statute of limitations . . .016 .12 .025 .19
 No fault -.0096 -.043 .102 .03
 Informed consent .018** .121** .102 .05 .210* .10*
 Lawyers per capita ... ... .065 .12 . . .
 Respondeat superior .. . . ... .... .243* .16* * Significant at P = .10.
 ** Significant at P = .05.
 L
 >
 z
 z
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 TABLE 5
 YEAR-SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF LAWS ON FREQUENCY (F), SEVERITY (A),
 AND TOTAL CLAIM COST (T)*
 All Year
 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 Constrainedt
 1970 laws:
 F .116 .168 .239 .159 .123 .143
 (1.35) (2.51) (3.14) (2.14) (1.41) (2.81)
 A . . . .167 .031 .048 .066 .069
 S. . (1.72) (.35) (.60) (.92) (1.38)
 T . .. .077 .391 .340 .229 .215
 S. . (.72) (3.38) (3.41) (2.16) (2.80)
 1970 statute of
 limitations:
 A . . .028 - .025 .013 .035 .016
 . . . (1.43) (1.38) (.79) (2.47) (1.59)
 T ... .009 .054 .020 .068 .025
 (.35) (2.00) (.89) (2.77) (1.44)
 No fault:
 F ... - .201 - .06 - .07 .003 -.143
 (1.81) (.50) (.58) (.02) (1.56)
 A. . .205 .108 -.005 .103 .102
 (1.74) (1.66) (.05) (1.15) (1.57)
 T. . .114 .128 .036 .130 .104
 (.68) (.71) (.23) (.77) (.85)
 1970 informed
 consent
 F .202 .265 .404 .314 .338 .272
 (1.54) (2.51) (3.38) (2.83) (2.57) (3.51)
 T . . .132 .560 .340 .246 .210
 (.80) (3.11) (2.07) (1.48) (1.75)
 1970 respondeat
 superior
 T ... .225 .378 .278 .305 .243
 (1.24) (1.77) (1.49) (1.67) (1.85)
 Cap:
 A . .. -.008 -.014 -.009 -.001 -.008
 (1.26) (2.28) (1.54) (.23) (2.03)
 Collateral
 source:
 A . .. -.011 -.035 -.027 -.009 -.021
 (.84) (2.96) (2.66) (.87) (2.61)
 Ad damnum:
 T . . . - .088 - .035 - .050 - .048 - .073
 (3.38) (1.27) (1.98) (1.76) (3.17)
 Fee limit:
 A ... .006 -.020 -.013 .002 -.007
 (.52) (1.85) (1.46) (.16) (1.03)
 T . . . - .013 -.011 -.012 .011 -.016
 (.77) (.61) (.76) (.60) (1.21)
 * Coefficients from adding law variables to final specification in table 3; ItI in parentheses.
 t Coefficients constrained to be equal in all years.
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 Whether or not particular medical procedures generate disproportion-
 ately high claim frequencies is of some policy interest. Unequal probabil-
 ity of suit if negligent distorts the expected cost to physicians of different
 procedures and hence may distort medical choices and the quality of care.
 However, separate effects of quantity and complexity or mix of medical
 treatments could not be identified. Controlling for physician density, ex-
 planatory power was not increased by adding full-time equivalent hospital
 staff per patient day (a measure of labor intensity or quality) or the ratio of
 hospital cost per day to the average manufacturing wage (a measure of
 capital intensity). The effect of number of surgeons per capita was not
 statistically different from the effect of nonsurgical specialists. This evi-
 dence casts doubt on Mueller's conclusion that complex hospital facilities
 generate more claims, and Feldman's that surgery rates are a significant
 determinant of claims.28 Neither study controlled for quantity of medical
 treatments. This is likely to bias upward the estimated effect of the partic-
 ular type of treatment measured, since quantity and complexity are highly
 correlated.29 Mueller's results are also influenced by the use of population
 weights, which yields estimates dominated by the few most populous
 states (see Appendix B).
 Claim frequency is unrelated to the percentage of the population over
 sixty-five. Since hospital admission rates of the elderly are roughly twice
 as high as for persons under sixty-five and the rate of negligent injury per
 admission is roughly twice as high for the elderly, the absence of any
 significant difference in claim frequency implies that the probability of
 filing a claim, given a potentially actionable injury, is roughly one-fourth
 that of persons under sixty-five, presumably because of lower compen-
 sable damages.30 This evidence suggests the more general conclusion,
 that claims with small stakes are deterred from filing by the fixed costs of
 litigation.3' If so, the tort system will underdeter minor carelessness.
 28 Roger Feldman, The Determinants of Medical Malpractice Incidents: Theory of Con-
 tingency Fees and Empirical Evidence, 7, no. 2 Atlantic Econ. J. 59 (1979). Marnie Mueller,
 The Economics of Medical Malpractice: Claims, Awards and Defensive Medicine, paper
 presented at Am. Econ. Ass'n meetings (1976).
 29 The correlation between surgical and nonsurgical specialists per capita is 0.85.
 30 CMA, supra note 9, reports a rate of iatrogenic injury twice as high for persons over
 sixty-five, but no difference in the proportion due to negligence. The positive relation be-
 tween claim frequency and population over sixty-five reported in Mueller, supra note 28, is
 due to the large weight assigned to Florida, which was an outlier in 1970. Either including a
 dummy variable for Florida or replacing population with Amemiya-Nold weights eliminates
 the positive coefficient of population over 65. See Appendix B.
 31 It is consistent with the findings in Danzon and Lillard, that small claims are more likely
 to be dropped without payment and are less likely to be pursued to verdict. Patricia Munch
 Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice
 Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983).
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 Per capita income has no significant effect on frequency or severity,
 after controlling for physician and lawyer densities. This suggests that the
 high simple correlations between income and both frequency and severity
 are attributable to the medical and legal characteristics associated with
 high income. Income apparently has little effect on the net expected pay-
 off and propensity to sue, possibly because the positive effect of higher
 compensable damages is offset by the negative effect of high time costs.
 A measure of urbanization was included without any specific theoret-
 ical justification, although it can be rationalized as a catch-all for such
 factors as easier access to litigation, greater willingness to sue because of
 depersonalized physician-patient relationships, and so forth. Controlling
 for physician density, urbanization is the most significant and, in terms of
 elasticities, the most powerful predictor of frequency. The elasticity of
 frequency with respect to the percentage of the state urbanized is .86. In
 part this may reflect a supply response to the higher verdicts awarded by
 urban courts: the elasticity of severity with respect to percentage of state
 urbanized is .80. This understates the difference in compensation per unit
 of loss (r) if an increase in r induces the filing of more marginal claims
 which pulls down observed average severity. Attempts to identify further
 the characteristics of urban environments that influence claim frequency
 and severity were unsuccessful. The urban coefficient is essentially unaf-
 fected by including number of lawyers and specific laws. Other variables
 that proved insignificant and were therefore dropped include: the percent-
 age of the population on welfare, the unemployment rate, and court de-
 lay.32
 As a measure of the deterrent effect of tort sanctions on physicians'
 behavior, I tried including the level and rate of increase of malpractice
 insurance premiums. If such deterrence exists, these variables do not
 capture it.33
 Price of Legal Services
 The number of lawyers per capita was included as a proxy for the cost
 of legal services. But the finding, that lawyer density has no effect on
 claim frequency after controlling for physician density and urbanization
 and is positively related to claim severity, suggests that high lawyer den-
 32 Average time from service of answer to trial in personal injury litigation in federal
 courts in the major urban areas of the state. Source: Institute for Judicial Administration,
 Calendar Status Study (1970, 1972, 1974).
 33 The signs were always positive, possibly because any negative deterrent effect was
 dominated by the reverse, positive effective of frequency on premiums. However, there was
 also no evidence of a deterrent effect of premiums on the rate of change of claim frequency.
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 sity does not in fact indicate low cost of legal services.34 A decline in the
 cost of legal services is expected to increase the frequency of suits but not
 necessarily affect severity since optimum legal effort for both plaintiff and
 defense increases, with offsetting effects on severity. A plausible explana-
 tion for the findings is that high lawyer density reflects high demand for
 legal services and therefore does not imply low cost.35 Even the low
 estimated elasticity of severity with respect to number of lawyers (.12)
 overestimates any net effect of lawyer density on severity, because of
 endogeneity bias.
 At the time of the malpractice crisis, the surge of malpractice litigation
 was widely blamed on lawyers displaced from automobile litigation by the
 passage of no-fault laws.36 This argument would be sound only if the
 number of displaced lawyers was sufficiently large to depress the supply
 price of legal services on malpractice cases. It is unpersuasive a priori
 because most of the automobile tort thresholds were set so low as to
 constitute little bar to litigation, and it tends to be refuted by the evidence.
 The constrained estimates show a positive effect of no-fault on malprac-
 tice severity but a negative effect on claim frequency, whereas the pre-
 dicted effects are positive for frequency, and ambiguous for severity, if
 no-fault did indeed depress attorney wage rates. Even if the coefficients
 are taken at face value, they imply minimal effects: states that adopted
 no-fault had an 11 percent higher claim severity, a 13 percent lower claim
 frequency, with no significant net effect on total claim cost per capita.
 If professional associations can raise wage rates by restricting competi-
 tion, then the percentage of attorneys who are members of the American
 Bar Association (ABA) should be positively related to attorney wage
 rates. Contrary to the implications of this hypothesis, claim frequency is
 unrelated to ABA membership and claim severity is lower in states where
 ABA membership is high. Thus none of these variables yields a plausible
 estimate of the supply response of claims to the cost of legal services.
 34 If lawyers per capita and percentage ABA are included alone, the elasticity of fre-
 quency with respect to lawyer density is .275 and significant at P = .05.
 3 This is consistent with Pashigian's conclusion from time-series analysis of the market
 for legal services, that increases in the number of lawyers reflect demand rather than exoge-
 nous supply shifts. Between 1959 and 1969, the number of lawyers per capita increased, but
 mean and median annual earnings of lawyers rose relative to those of other salaried male
 workers. B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for
 and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J. Law & Econ. 53 (1977).
 36 For example, U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on
 Health, Hearings December 3, 1975, Continuing Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, at
 142.
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 Pre-1975 Laws
 Specific laws were added last to test whether they merely reflect demo-
 graphic factors or whether they have additional explanatory power.37 The
 estimates imply that the four pro-plaintiff common-law doctrines included
 in the compound variable, 1970 LAWS (abolition of the locality rule and
 of charitable immunity, admission of informed consent, and respondeat
 superior) contributed significantly to claim frequency through the mid-
 1970s. On average over the period 1975-78, states which recognized all
 four doctrines by 1970 had 53 percent higher claim frequency per capita,
 28 percent higher severity, and 86 percent higher total claim cost per
 capita than states which recognized none. Of the four doctrines, informed
 consent had the greatest impact.
 The effects of these laws on severity are positive but not statistically
 significant, which on theoretical grounds is not surprising. By expanding
 the scope of liability, informed consent, abolition of charitable immunity,
 and application of respondeat superior will induce the filing of claims
 which would not otherwise have been filed. The mean true damages of
 claims filed may rise or fall. The possibility of naming hospitals as
 codefendants on claims against physicians will tend to raise potential
 awards by raising defense costs.38 Abolition of the locality rule expands
 liability and reduces the cost of establishing liability, so it may raise the
 plantiff's optimum legal effort, hence raising potential awards on all
 claims but inducing more marginal claims, with an ambiguous net effect
 on observed severity.
 These estimates probably overstate the net causal effect on claims of
 these specific laws because of correlation with other unmeasured differ-
 ences in legal doctrine and endogeneity bias; that is, these doctrines may
 have been adopted in states which, for other reasons, had a relatively high
 claim frequency. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the laws had a net
 positive effect is supported by the pattern of the coefficients over time,
 and their significance after controlling for variables which might be in-
 cluded as predictors in a full simultaneous model. Table 5, which reports
 individual year coefficients, shows that the effects peaked in 1976 and
 declined thereafter. Claims closed in later years would include an increas-
 ing number filed after 1970, for which 1970 LAWS is an inaccurate mea-
 sure of applicable law, since the doctrines became more widespread dur-
 ing the 1970s.
 37 The choice of which variables to consider predetermined is to some extent arbitrary.
 38 Danzon & Lillard, supra note 31.
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 To test whether trends in malpractice litigation merely mirror trends in
 litigation in general, measures of the frequency and severity of claims for
 two other lines-owners', landlords', and tenants' (OLT) and manufac-
 turers' and contractors' liability-were included.39 The correlations were
 surprisingly low, and only the most significant, OLT severity, is included
 here. It is positively related to malpractice severity and average claim
 cost per capita, negatively related to malpractice claim frequency. The
 negative relation between claim frequency and OLT is consistent with a
 negative correlation between observed severity and r, because a high r
 induces marginal claims.
 Post-1975 Tort Reforms
 These data on claims closed 1975-78 cannot show full long-run effects
 of reforms enacted 1975-76 because many of the claims would have been
 filed before the effective dates of the reforms and hence would be unaf-
 fected. Nevertheless, if the reforms significantly reduced the expected net
 payoff to filing, then the number of claims filed, especially claims with low
 potential recoveries, might be expected to fall immediately. Since minor
 claims account for a large fraction of the total and settle quickest, a
 reduction in claims filed could reduce claims closed within a year. Thus,
 whether the postcrisis tort reforms contributed to the observed reduction
 in frequency after 1975 is an important empirical question.
 Error in measuring the post-1975 tort reforms is inevitable, because of
 the need to reduce the diverse and complex statutes to a few common
 dimensions. The laws are measured here as months from the date on
 which changes became effective. This emphasizes differences between
 states passing laws early rather than late, and is more accurate if the full
 impact of a change only appears with a lag because of lags in disposition.40
 Predicted values of the laws are used. The coefficients are expected to
 increase in magnitude and significance over time as the fraction of claims
 closed subject to the new laws increases. Table 5 reports individual year
 coefficients where these approach conventional statistical significance in
 any year.
 Several of the measures designed to reduce awards appear to have had
 their intended effect. Using the coefficients for the full 1975-78 period
 (last column) the estimates imply that states enacting a cap effective in
 39 These were the only other liability lines for which data were available by state.
 40 Dummy variables for states ever passing a law yielded estimates similar to those using
 months, which are reported here.
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 January 1975 had 19 percent lower awards on average by January 1977.41
 States mandating the offset of compensation from collateral sources in
 January 1975 had 50 percent lower awards by January 1977, whereas laws
 admitting evidence of collateral compensation without mandating offset
 had no significant effect. Elimination of the plaintiffs ad damnum is es-
 timated to have a significantly negative effect on total claim cost, although
 for frequency or severity individually the effect is not statistically signifi-
 cant. Limits on contingent fees show some sign of reducing severity and
 total claim costs, but the significance level is low. There is no evidence
 that the tort reforms contributed to the post-1975 reduction in frequency.
 Contrary to the expectation that the impact of the reforms would increase
 over time, the coefficients tend to be largest in 1976. This casts doubt on
 how much of the observed effect is attributable to the laws per se rather
 than to changes in attitude that accompanied (and contributed to) changes
 in the law. If so, the observed effects may be short-lived.
 The statute of limitations was expected to be positively related to claim
 frequency, particularly in times of changing legal standards. The mea-
 sured effect of the pre-1975 statute of limitations on claim frequency is
 positive but not statistically significant, whereas the effect on severity is
 significantly positive.42 A plausible explanation is that claims filed long
 after the incident involve above average stakes, because delay increases
 the costs of filing so eliminates proportionately more minor claims. Be-
 cause the sample of paid claims is under 100 in many states, one or two
 very large claims can dominate average severity.43 The effect on claims
 closed peaks in 1978, reflecting filings in the peak filing years of 1973-75.
 There is no evidence in these data that the post-1975 reductions in
 statutes of limitations had any effect. However, since these changes will
 operate with an even longer lag than other tort reforms, less impact is
 expected to be evident in 1975-78 closures. In fact, there may be an initial
 perverse effect, if filings are accelerated in response to a shortening of the
 statute.
 Regressions not reported here failed to show any significant effect on
 claim frequency or severity of any of the following post-1975 laws: volun-
 tary or mandatory pretrial screening panels; arbitration; restrictions on
 41 .008 X 24 = .192. Obviously this effect does not accumulate indefinitely. Individual
 year coefficients may be insignificant because of small sample size.
 42 Measurement of the statute of limitations is inaccurate to the extent courts in fact
 recognize a discovery rule even in states where no such rule is enacted in statute.
 43 The dominating influence of large claims is illustrated by the fact that 3 percent of
 claims account for 50 percent of total dollars paid.
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 informed consent; restrictions on the use of res ipsa; periodic payment of
 future damages.
 Because of data limitations, these are rough estimates of short-run
 effects, especially for changes in the statute of limitations. Nevertheless,
 it is reasonably safe to conclude that while the laws limiting awards have
 had an immediate effect on severity, neither these nor the other tort
 reforms can explain the dramatic post-1975 drop in frequency.
 V. DETERMINANTS OF THE POST-1975 TORT REFORMS
 In response to the 1975 crisis, legislatures in every state adopted some
 program of tort reforms, which vary in number, stringency, and timing.
 Here I consider four measures: an aggregate of the total number out of
 twelve possible laws which were passed, each weighted by the number of
 months in effect;44 limits on contingent fees; the reduction in the statute
 of limitations; and the number of years of the new statute of limitations.
 The medical profession has an obvious stake in reducing the mean and
 variance of claim costs. If premiums are unregulated, the insurance indus-
 try has an interest in reducing the variance but not necessarily the mean of
 claim costs, since the demand for insurance may rise as expected losses
 increase. However, by 1975 insurance rate increases were being denied
 by regulators in many states. The legal profession is expected to oppose
 legislation designed to reduce frequency and size of claims or bypass
 judicial forums. Following standard public choice theory, I hypothesize
 that the power of a lobby is positively related to the number of its mem-
 bers, negatively related to the costs of organization. The numerical
 strength and organization costs of the medical profession are measured by
 physician density per capita and the percentage of physicians in the state
 who belonged to the state or local medical society in 1974. Lawyer den-
 sity per capita measures the numerical strength of the legal profession.
 The number of insurers active in the state is not known precisely, but as a
 rough proxy I include the market share of the leading writer in 1974.
 The incentive of physicians to lobby for legislation is expected to be
 positively related to the absolute level and percentage increase of insur-
 ance premiums in 1975. I hypothesize that public support of tort reform
 would be stronger, the more severe the crisis, as measured by the fre-
 quency and severity of claims in 1975. I also include the number of pro-
 plaintiff common-law doctrines recognized, to test whether rulemaking
 44 1975 LAWS = I2 Mj, where Mj = months prior to December 1978 that the jth law
 was in effect. The twelve laws are listed in Table A2.
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 through the common law and the statutory law processes are substitutes
 or complements.
 Table 6 reports the results. Three equations are reported for two of the
 dependent variables, each including a different measure of the severity of
 the crisis: the 1975 level and proposed increase in insurance premiums,
 the actual frequency of claims closed in 1975 and the predicted frequen-
 cy.45
 The size and cohesiveness of the medical profession apparently had
 little impact on the total number/early enactment of tort reforms. The
 early passage of a limit on contingent fees was more likely in states with
 high physician density and a large proportion of physicians belonging to a
 local medical society, but these effects are not highly significant. The
 number of lawyers has the expected effect: high density of lawyers per
 capita tends to reduce the number of reforms enacted and, in particular,
 to reduce the probability of a limit on contingent fees.
 The expected sign of the share of the insurance market written by the
 largest carrier is ambiguous a priori: high concentration implies few firms
 but a larger stake per firm and lower organization costs. In fact, the
 number of laws passed is significantly negatively related to the dominant
 firm's market share, which suggests that the number of insurers with a
 stake in the market contributed to the number and promptness of tort
 reform. But if this interpretation is correct, the absence of any significant
 effect on the statute of limitations is surprising, since a long statute of
 limitations is a major source of risk to insurers.
 Urbanized states tended to adopt more numerous and early reforms,
 reduce their statutes of limitations by a greater amount, and adopt abso-
 lutely shorter statutes. States with relatively pro-plaintiff common law
 made more numerous/early changes in statutory law, including limits on
 contingent fees. Since these tort reforms tend to restrict plaintiff rights,
 this suggests significant differences in the relative power of the various
 interest groups in influencing common and statutory law.
 All of the measures of the extent of crisis-level and proposed increase
 in insurance premiums, frequency or severity of claims-appear to have
 had only a weak effect on the extent of tort reform. Of the various mea-
 sures tried, the proposed premium increase in 1975 has the greatest ex-
 planatory power. This is not surprising. In the long run, high premiums
 can be passed through in higher fees for medical services, but in the short
 run fees are sticky due to reimbursement practices of third-party payers.
 45 Because of the lag between filing and closing claims, frequency of claims closed in 1975
 may be viewed as predetermined. Predicted values of severity were not significant.
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 TABLE 6
 DETERMINANTS OF POST-1975 TORT REFORMS
 Post- Change
 1975 in
 Number of Laws Limit on Statute of Statute of
 (1975 Laws) Contingent Fees Limitations Limitations
 M.D.'s per capita -.310 -1.348 4.559 18.290 14.236 27.003 4.177 -4.111
 (.04) (.18) (.51) (1.29) (.94) (1.51) (1.34) (.09)
 1970 laws 3.151 2.763 3.541 9.549 8.522 10.208 .337 - .930
 (2.21) (1.84) (2.14) (3.34) (2.87) (3.09) (.53) (1.05)
 % urban .217 .159 .174 .110 .001 .003 -.174 .176
 (2.23) (1.64) (1.70) (.566) (.001) (.16) (4.04) (2.92)
 % medical society .085 -1.399 5.367 23.529 19.151 33.778 -5.061 9.916
 (.01) (.12) (.41) (1.05) (.82) (1.29) (1.02) (1.44)
 1975 premium .469 . . . ... 1.184 ... ... .465 -.699
 (.78) (.98) (1.74) (1.87)
 ISO increase 1.714 . . . . . . 2.852 . . . ... -.442 .022
 (1.78) (1.47) (1.04) (.04)
 Share -.236 -.206 -.223 -.199 -.139 -.174 -.002 .006
 (2.88) (2.46) (2.51) (1.21) (.84) (.99) (.06) (.12)
 Lawyers per capita - 1.502 -2.358 -1.35 -4.869 -6.725 -4.544 - 1.07 -.277
 (1.07) (1.56) (.80) (1.73) (2.25) (1.34) (.17) (.32)
 1975 actual claims . . . 38.755 . . . . . . 94.593 . . . . . . per capita (1.14) (1.40)
 1975 predicted claims . . . . . . -33.046 . . . . .. -60.940
 per capita (.57) (.53)
 C 3.254 11.141 3.245 -44.963 -26.488 -43.557 13.769 -9.867
 (.28) (.92) (.24) (1.91) (1.10) (1.58) (2.65) (1.36)
 R2 .395 .350 .318 .389 .362 .319 .365 .310
 M t!1
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 Thus a large sudden premium increase imposes greater costs on physi-
 cians than an equivalent, more gradual total increase.
 VI. CONCLUSIONS
 Although trends in malpractice litigation have paralleled trends in other
 lines, this analysis of the contribution of medical, demographic, and legal
 factors to malpractice litigation indicates that factors specific to medical
 care and malpractice law have significant explanatory power. The growth
 in medical services since the mid-1960s has contributed to, but certainly
 does not fully account for, the increase in claims and persistent diversity
 among states. In the absence of good measures for expected compensa-
 tion per unit damages (r) or the cost of legal services, I have been unable
 to estimate explicit supply elasticities of claims in response to changes in
 these variables. The supply of lawyers does not appear to have a signifi-
 cant independent effect.
 The strong effect on claim frequency of pro-plaintiff common-law doc-
 trines implies that laws do make a difference and are not merely a reflec-
 tion of more fundamental, underlying forces. This conclusion is rein-
 forced by the evidence that post-1975 tort reforms designed to reduce
 awards-in particular, dollar caps and mandatory offset of compensation
 from collateral sources-have significantly reduced severity. However,
 these estimates of the effect of the post-1975 tort reforms must be viewed
 as rough measures of their short-run impact.
 Two important questions remain unanswered. The first is to identify the
 characteristics of urban environments which generate higher claim fre-
 quency and severity. Urbanization is the single most powerful predictor
 of both frequency and severity, even after controlling for higher physician
 and lawyer density in urban states, more pro-plaintiff common law and
 the frequency and severity of claims in other liability lines. Higher awards
 by urban courts are probably one factor inducing the higher claim fre-
 quency. Other factors which were tried but do not account for urban
 litigiousness include more complex medical facilities, per capita income,
 welfare and unemployment rates.
 The second unexplained puzzle is the post-1975 decline in claim fre-
 quency. It can apparently not be attributed to the tort reforms-which
 does not mean that these reforms will not reduce frequency in the longer
 run. The decline in frequency can apparently also not be attributed to the
 deterrent power of tort sanctions, at least as measured by malpractice
 insurance premiums. It is possible that the post-1975 decline in frequency
 was a temporary lull due to a transitory attitude associated with the 1975
 crisis. It is also possible that the preceding peak was the aberration,
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 reflecting the backlog of potential claims which became worth filing as a
 result of the pro-plaintiff shift in common law in the sixties, combined
 with long statutes of limitations. The postcrisis reduction in statutes of
 limitations should have reduced the destabilizing potential, should an-
 other such pro-plaintiff shift in doctrine occur. Until a longer time series
 of claim data is available, this hypothesis remains untested speculation.
 APPENDIX A
 COMMON AND STATUTORY LAWS
 TABLE Al
 APPLICATION OF KEY DOCTRINES: 1970
 Locality Respondeat Charitable Informed
 State Rule* Superiort ImmunityT Consent?
 AL 0 0 1
 AK
 AZ 0 ... I
 R 0 1 0
 CA 1 1 1 1
 O 0  0 
 CT 0 0 1
 DE  1 0 1
 FL 1  1 
 GA 1 0 0
 HI ... I 1 1
ID 0 1 1
 IL   
 IN 0 0 1 1
 IA 1 1  
 KS 0 0 1 1
 Y 1 1 1
 LA 0 0 0 1
 ME 0 ... 1
 D 0 ... 1
 MA 1 . 1
 I  I 1 I
N 1 1 1
 MS 0 1 1
 O 0 1 1
 MT 0 1 1 0
 NE 0 1 1
 V 0 . . 0
 NH 1 1 1
 J   1
 NM 0 ... .
 Y 1 1 1 1
 NC    
 D 1 ... 1
OH  1
 K 1  1
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 TABLE Al (continued)
 Locality Respondeat Charitable Informed
 State Rule* Superiort Immunityt Consent?
 OR 1 1 1 1
 PA    
RI 0 1 1
 SC 0 .. 0
 D 0 1 . I
 TN   1 1
 X 1 1 0 
UT 1 1 1
 V  0 ... 1
 A 0 1 0
 WA 1 1 1 1
V I 1 1
 I 1  
Y ... .
 DC 0 1 1
 SouRcE.-Stephen Dietz, C. Bruce Baird, & Lawrence Berul, The Medical Malpractice System, in
 Appendix to the Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice, 73-89, DHEW No. (OS)
 (1973).
 NOTE.-. .. = missing data.
 * 1 = rejected or expanded, 0 = applied.
 t 1 = expanded or applied, 0 = rejected.
 $ 1 = rejected, 0 = expanded or applied.
 ? 1 = applied, 0 = rejected or expanded.
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 TABLE A2
 POST-1975 TORT REFORMS
 PAT AD COLL REC PER LOC RES PAN ARB INF FEE ST70 D70 ST75 D75
 State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
 AK . . . 76 76 . . . 76 ... 76 76 76 76 . . . 2 1 2 1
 AL ... 75 ... ... 75 75 75 ... 75 ... ... 6 0 4 0
 AZ ... 76 76 ... ... 76 76 76 ... ... 76 2 1 3 0
 AR ... 79 ... ... 79 ... 79 76 ... ... ... 2 1 2 1
 CA . . . 75 75 75 75 ... ... . 75 75 75 1 1 3 0
 CO 76 76 ... 76 ... .. ... ... 77 ... ... ... 2 1 5 0 CT ..... .. . .. . ... 78 .... .. ... 3 0 3 0 DE ... ... 76 . . . 76 76 76 76 . . . 76 76 2 0 3 0
 FL 75 75 76 . . . 76 76 76 75 . . . 75 76 4 1 4 0
 GA ... 76 ... ... ... ... ... . ......... 2 1 2 0
 HI 76 76 . ... . . . . ... 76 . . . 76 77 6 1 6 0
 IA . . . 75 75 . . ... ... ... . . . . . 75 75 2 1 6 0
 ID ... 76 75 75 .... 75 75 75 .... 75 75 2 1 2 1
 IL 77 ... ... 77 77 ... ... 75 76 ... ... 5 1 4 0
 IN 75 75 ... 75 ... ... ... 75 ... ... 75 2 0 2 1
 KS 76 76 76 ... 76 ... ... 76 ... ... 76 2 0 4 0
 KY 76 76 . . . . .. . . ... .. ... 76 ... 1 1 1 1 LA 75 75 ... 75 ... 75 ... 75 75 75 . . 1 1 3 0
 ME ... 77 ... ... .... ... ... 77 78 77 ... 2 1 2 1
 MD ... 76 ... ... 76 ... ... 76 ... ... 76 3 1 5 0
 MA ... 76 ... ... ... . .. ... 76 ... ... ... 3 1 3 1
 MI ... ... ... ... 75 ... 78 . . . 76 . . . . . . 2 1 2 1
 N ... ..... ...... ... ............ 2 1 2 1
 MS ... . ................... ...... 6 1 2 1
 MO ... 73 ... ... . ... . . 77 ... .. .. . 2 1 10 0 T ... ... ... ... ... . ...  ... .. .. . 3 1 5 
 0
 0
 ci
 z
 z
 0
 C-
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 NE 76 76 76 76 ... .... . . . 76 . . . 76 76 2 1 6 0
 NV ... ... ... ... ... ... 75 75 ... 75 ... 2 0 4 0
 NH ... 77 77 77 77 . .. 77 72 ... 77 77 6 1 6 1
 NJ ... . . ... ... ... .. ... 78 . .. .. .. . 2 1 2 1
 NM 76 77 ... 76 ... ... ... 76 ... . .. ... 3 1 3 0
 NY ... 76 75 ... ... ... ... 75 ... 76 76 3 1 2 0
 NC ... 76 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 76 ... 3 0 4 0
 ND 77 ... 77 77 77 ... 77 77 ... 77 . . . 2 1 6 0
 OH . . . 75 75 75 ... ... ... 75 75 75 ... 1 0 4 0
 OK ......... ...... ... ........ O 0 3 0
 OR 75 ... . . . ... 75 . . . ... ... ... ... 75 2 1 5 0
 PA 76 ... 76 76 . .. ... ... 76 . . 76 76 2 1 2 0
 RI ... 76 76 ... . . . ... 76 76 ... 76 ... 2 1 2 1
 SC 76 ... . . . ... 76 . .. . ... ... ... ... 6 0 6 1 D ... ... 76 76 ... ... . . . 76 ... ... 2  3 
 TN ... 75 75 ... ... 75 75 75 . . 75 75 1 0 3 0
 TX . . . 77 ... 77 . . . . . . 77 ... ... 77 . . . 2 1 2 0
 UT ... 76 ... ... .. . . . ... 76 ... 4 1 4 0
 VT ... . .. . . ... 76 ... 76 76 ... 3 1 20 0A . . .. 76 ... 76 ... 76 76 2 0 2 1
 WA ... 76 76 . . . 76 76 ... ... ... 76 76 3 0 8 0
 V ... .... ... . ... ... 2 0 2 1
 WI 76 76 ... 75 75 ... ... 75 76 ... 75 3 1 3 1
 WY 78 76 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 0 2 1
 D C . . . . . . ...... ... .. . . . . . .. . 3 1 3 1
 NOTE.-Entries indicate year change became effective; includes reforms subsequently challenged.
 (1) PAT = patient compensation fund pays awards above threshold, usually $100,000. (2) AD = ad damnum: prohibits mention in claim of dollar amount
 demanded. (3) COLL = collateral source rule modified to permit evidence or mandate offset. (4) CAP = limit on recovery. (5) PER = periodic payment of award
 for future damages permitted or mandated. (6) LOC = standard of care defined by "similar communities." (7) RES = prohibits or clarifies use of res ipsa. (8)
 PAN = pretrial screening panel. (9) ARB = provides for voluntary, binding arbitration. (10) INF = clarifies required elements of informed consent. (11) FEE =
 limit on plaintiff attorney's contingent fee. (12) ST70 = pre-1975 statute for adults. (13) D70 = pre-1975 discovery rule. (14) ST75 = post-1978 statute for adults.
 (15) D75 = post-1978 discovery rule.
 trl
 H)
 tp
 -4
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 APPENDIX B
 EFFECTS OF WEIGHTS
 Table BI1 shows the effects of different weights on regression estimates of claim
 frequency in 1970. The specification is not identical to that in Mueller, but is
 sufficiently similar to illustrate the point.
 Using population weights, surgeon density (surgeons per M.D.) and the per-
 centage of population aged sixty-five or older have positive coefficients in the first
 equation. A Cook's distance test shows that California and Florida have a
 significant impact on these coefficient estimates.46 In the second equation, which
 includes dummy variables for California and Florida, the coefficients of surgeon
 density and the percentage of old people are similar in magnitude and significance
 but the signs are negative. This suggests that the positive association between
 surgeon density and old people and claim frequency reported by Mueller is due to
 the fact that these variables take relatively high values in states which, for other
 reasons, have relatively high claim frequency and which are relatively populous,
 hence receive large weight in population-weighted regressions. In the second pair
 of regressions, using Amemiya-Nold weights, neither variable is significant at
 conventional levels, with or without controlling for Florida and California.
 TABLE Bi
 EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE WEIGHTS DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
 CLAIM FREQUENCY [log ( F F
 We = (n Weight 2 + nF 1
 Weight/ = (ni) W niFi(1 - F,) C -8.33 2.95 -3.39 1.24
 (2.35) (.77) (.85) (.28)
 % old 4.69 -4.69 3.03 -.98
 (1.48) (1.30) (.73) (-.22)
 % rich .001 .001 .0006 .0009
 (.77) (.95) (.34) (.57)
 % urban .005 .002 .008 .004
 (.67) (.28) (1.17) (.59)
 M.D.'s per capita .61 .34 .53 .52
 (3.01) (.91) (2.10) (2.11)
 Surgeons per M.D. 4.54 -4.77 -1.04 -4.27
 (1.84) (1.65) (- .34) (1.29)
 % unemployed .02 .12 .007 .06
 (.28) (1.73) (.08) (.66)
 1970 LAWS .09 .08 .09 .08
 (1.63) (1.63) (1.42) (1.30)
 Lawyers' income: .17 - .65 - .19 - .54
 (.44) (1.81) (-.50) (1.32)
 California ... .34 ... .32
 (2.54) (.77)
 Florida . . . 1.31 . . . 1.07
 (4.30) (2.10)
 R2 .620 .755 .478 .536
 46 A Cook's distance test identifies observations which shift parameter estimates outside
 a selected confidence interval (10 percent in this application) around the point estimate
 obtained using the full sample.
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